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Despite the recent emergence of Corporate 
Accelerators (CA), scholars and managers have 
questioned their effectiveness. This critique arises 
from the superficial and inadequate design 
recommendations that have left many CAs faltering. 
We explore how strategic CAs in the context of digital 
transformation can be designed to become effective 
open innovation units by offering a new 
conceptualization of the role of the strategic CA. Our 
multi-case study of four European CAs with a focus on 
IT startups reveals three underlying obstacles: (1) 
missing engagement of corporate employees, (2) 
difficulty of sourcing the right startups, and (3) 
differences between large firms and startups. Based on 
these, we propose a framework that captures the role 
of the strategic CA in correspondence with the 
identified obstacles. By emphasizing the CA’s role, we 
propose three essential tasks (motivating, 
matchmaking, and mediating) that are pertinent in the 
relationships between stakeholders in a CA ecosystem.  
1. Introduction  
The combination of digitalization and venture 
capital has ushered in an era of entrepreneurship [1] in 
which startup accelerators have gained popularity [2]. 
The emerging relevance of startups and accelerators 
plus the increasing pressure for large firms to innovate 
have resulted in amplified demand and perceived 
opportunity in their collaboration [3]. Among the 
predominant vehicles for outside-in open innovation 
(OI), the corporate accelerator (CA) has evolved as an 
OI program for established firms to access 
entrepreneurial innovation [4, 5]. Despite the 
burgeoning interest in CAs by researchers and 
managers alike it is relatively little explored [2, 6], 
which suggests the need of conceptual and practical 
toolkits to guide future research and practice. 
This is important because an examination of the 
CAs listed in the CA database Corporate Accelerator 
 
1 https://corporate-accelerators.net/database/ 
DB1 in 2016 shows that, 52% of the listed CAs can no 
longer be found and, therefore, likely have been 
discontinued or entirely realigned. In line with this, 
Kurpjuweit and Wagner [7] argued that existing 
programs have been adjusted due to dissatisfaction  
with and low success rates of current initiatives. This 
observation highlights the immense changes, 
volatility, and uncertainty [3] that characterizes the 
emerging phenomenon of CAs and suggests a need for 
further research to re-evaluate the assumptions 
underpinning the current designs and formats of CAs 
[8]. Moschner and Herstatt [9] provided further 
evidence to this trend and surmised that CAs are 
engaging in entrepreneurial washing – because firms 
often represent and design CAs as a symbolic action 
with marketing and branding as the underlying 
motivation and outcome.  
Furthermore, prior CA literature has been 
criticized for the fragmented and contradictory 
typologies and a lack of a deeper conceptualization of 
the specific roles, and challenges associated with CAs 
[10, 11]. This may be attributed to an extensive stream 
of CA literature adopting the design elements from the 
independent accelerator literature to the CA 
phenomenon (e.g., [2, 12, 13]). This implies that the 
CA literature lacks an adequate conceptualization on 
the key considerations for designing CAs. This relates 
to calls by scholars on the need to differentiate 
between strategic and financial-driven CA programs 
as they follow distinct logics [4, 14], and the design 
elements effective for independent accelerators not 
being fully applicable to strategic CAs [15]. This 
indicates a need to distinguish between strategic and 
financial CAs to avoid comparing apples and oranges.  
We address these issues, by analyzing how 
strategic CA programs can be understood more 
profoundly with regard to their underlying roles, 
inherent obstacles, and potential success factors. The 
sought understanding should reveal implications on 
the optimal design that are not superficial but anchored 
in the core of the construct, hence our guiding research 





question is: "What are key considerations for the 
effective design of strategic CAs?" 
Our study augments existing research by 
providing insights into some fundamental and 
underlying aspects of strategic CAs grounded in an 
explorative multi-case study of four European CA 
programs. We found that it is not the individual design 
manifestations per se that makes a CA an effective tool 
for OI but the optimal fulfillment of the underlying 
role of the strategic CA. This role is realized by 
fulfilling three essential tasks: matchmaking, 
mediating and motivating which are in correspondence 
with the underlying obstacles inherent in the 
collaboration between startups and incumbent firms.  
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Conceptualizing Corporate Accelerators 
The most renowned definition of accelerators 
stems from Cohen and Hochberg [16] who referred to 
accelerators as a fixed-term, cohort-based program 
supporting new ventures to define, build and scale 
their initial products or services [16]. This 
conceptualization has further been applied to the 
concept of CAs, described as outside-in OI programs 
for corporates to engage with startups [5] and as 
"programs of limited duration that support cohorts of 
startups during the new venture process via mentoring, 
education, and company-specific resources" [17, 
p.348]. However, the respective terminology has been 
controversially discussed in scientific literature so that 
results have not been uniform, and CAs remain to be 
dissentingly defined (e.g., [2, 6, 13, 16, 18, 19]). In 
fact, the current scientific definitions are deemed to be 
problematic as "conceptualizing accelerators in terms 
of what they are not (i.e., not incubators) or by where 
they are contextually situated (differentiating between 
types of accelerators) fails to explain what acceleration 
really is" [6, p.19]. Hence, CAs need to be understood 
as a next generational model of incubation within the 
corporate context, where strategic objectives, such as 
OI and organizational learning (OL), and processual 
factors, such as being time-limited, are considered to 
shape its distinct character and, thus, the design of this 
specific startup engagement vehicle in line and in 
contrast to independent accelerators. 
2.1.1 The Strategic CA: There is evidence in 
literature [4, 7, 14] that it is pivotal to differentiate 
between financial CAs targeted towards accelerating 
the venture emergence itself and strategic CAs 
primarily targeted towards accelerating the strategic fit 
of the collaboration between the startups and the 
corporate [4] or the integration into the parental firm’s 
value chain [7]. Due to this difference in objectives 
and the underlying logic as well as their influence on 
various design elements, Kurpjuweit and Wagner [7] 
have argued that this form of startup engagement 
cannot even be considered corporate acceleration and 
should instead be regarded as an entirely new form of 
startup engagement [7]. Thus, our focus is entirely on 
strategic CAs, which are insufficiently researched and 
most promising to foster OI [4]. 
There is consensus among scholars that both 
financial and non-financial metrics are deemed to be 
important outcomes in a strategic CA [4, 6, 13, 23]. 
The latter in particular seems to be very well suited for 
assessing the success of OI goals which represents a 
critical target to be measured [20]. Crișan et al. [6] 
identified that success measures within CA are often 
financially focused, biased, and not researched well 
enough. Further, they find a common tendency to 
confound outcomes (long-term value for the parental 
firm through innovation) with outputs (e.g., short-term 
financial returns, number of startups accelerated), due 
to output-based metrics which display an increased 
focus on economic and rather hard than soft outcomes, 
which may be contradicting for the strategic intent of 
strategic CAs [6]. These misconceptions help explain, 
to some degree, the paucity found in existing research 
to imply the performance of strategic CAs and their 
outcomes. Hence, there is a lack of research 
suggesting appropriate concepts for success measures 
in the context of CAs [20, 22, 24, 25].  
 
2.1.2 The Design of Strategic CAs: As the underlying 
strategic objectives and types of CAs differ 
significantly, there has been strong scholarly interest 
in identifying the design elements of CAs and their 
manifestations in practice [14, 17, 20]. The names (e.g. 
design configurations, dimensions and considerations) 
and reasons for establishing and utilizing these design 
elements (e.g. classification and recommendations) 
vary. However, the conceptualizations are similar as 
they list elements and characteristics of CAs often 
adopted from the independent accelerator literature, 
which the sponsors of the CA can actively configure 
to design these in a certain way to achieve the desired 
objectives effectively. In this paper, the latter are 
referred to uniformly as design elements.  
While early research has considered accelerators 
to be homogenous in their design, scholars argue that 
differences in the funding sponsors and objectives of 
accelerators lead to heterogenous designs, which in 
turn influence accelerator performance [12]. Pauwels 
et al. [13] find that the underlying objectives and 
design themes of CAs determine the orchestration of 
the different design elements (cf. [20]). This 
exemplifies the underlying logic behind clustering 
CAs into types or design themes. Hence, several and 
Page 5383
partially contradicting CA typologies could be 
identified in the literature that exemplifies the 
scholarly heterogeneity among the different typologies 
of CAs and the concept of CA in general. This might 
be attributed to the need of scholars to cluster CAs by 
the criteria relevant to them and their angle of 
observation, as well as caused by the CA phenomenon 
being young and still in an era of ferment, leading to 
the emergence and disappearance of different subtypes 
of CAs and changing criteria of differentiation among 
them. The prior literature uses typologies to describe 
and explain the different manifestations of the design 
characteristics of CAs [14, 21].  
A review of the CA literature makes it evident that 
the design elements in the literature are partly based 
on the independent accelerator literature [12] or on a 
financial rather than strategic logic of the CAs [14]. 
This is in line with Jackson and Richter [18], who 
found that the program design of CAs is often inspired 
by and modeled upon independent accelerators. 
However, although the phenomenon of independent 
accelerators is highly successful, it is questionable if 
this approach, design, and techniques are at all 
transferable to the corporate context [22] and, if so, to 
what extent. Therefore, the literature's identified 
design elements and considerations may be more 
applicable to categorize CA programs and create 
typologies rather than to understand or imply an 
effective CA design. 
 
2.2 Outcomes of Corporate Accelerators 
2.2.1 Knowledge Creation & Transfer: When 
initiating a CA program, the acquisition of new 
knowledge represents, among others, a predominant 
outcome [9, 11, 12]. Well-aligned with the strategic 
objectives of CA programs [14], implicit forms of 
knowledge such as an entrepreneurial mindset or the 
different speed of working play a prominent role in the 
context of CAs [11]. Moreover, CAs collaborate with 
startups to complement the knowledge base of 
incumbents and compensate for deficits in 
technological advancements or market dynamics by 
absorbing explicit knowledge [24].  
Gür [23] has shined a light on absorptive capacity 
theory to explain the ability of firms to adopt and 
transfer knowledge from the CA. To conceptualize 
absorptive capacity for the specific application to CAs, 
Gür [23] suggested a framework constituting of four 
factors that influence the knowledge transfer between 
CAs and the corporation: The antecedents and 
strategic objectives, the design components of the 
accelerator per se, as well as contingent factors such 
as the company size, the strength of its brand or the 
type of outcomes of the acceleration period [23]. In 
contrast, Chesbrough [26] found that absorptive 
capacity may not be the most appropriate way to 
successfully insource external knowledge. Instead, he 
recommends to purposefully manage knowledge flows 
by designing specific mechanisms to direct these 
inflows of knowledge [26]. Moreover, it is deemed 
critical for CAs to develop a specific process to 
manage the relationships between the business lines 
and the startups to allow for a successful transfer of 
knowledge from the CA to the parent organization 
[25]. This crucial role can be fulfilled by business 
developers who ensure the strategic fit between the 
firm and the startup, managing the interactions 
between the different stakeholders [25].  
2.2.2 Other Outcomes: Besides the creation and 
transfer of knowledge, there are other outcomes of 
CAs. First, the startups can turn into paying customers 
after the completion of the program [21]. Moreover, 
startups can become suppliers, customers, or partners 
of the incumbent [17, 22]. Gutmann et al. [10] provide 
another perspective suggesting that one outcome of 
CAs can be customers of the organizing firm 
benefitting from the enrichment of product offerings 
through integrated startup solutions. Hence, 
incumbent firms attempt to enrich products and 
services with incremental innovation created by the 
startups, which is then integrated into the offering of 
the firm [10; 22].  
Under the outcomes of CA programs for 
incumbents, it is pivotal to assess the factors which 
may positively influence the outcomes of CAs. Thus, 
providing implications or lists of success factors has 
provoked considerable attention in the field of CA 
research (e.g., [15, 22]). In general, among the authors 
who have provided different perspectives on success 
factors, some patterns could be derived from factors 
that have been mentioned across multiple publications 
(e.g., [10, 14, 17, 20]. In that sense, success factors for 
CAs can be classified into seven distinct categories: 
(1) the ability to measure success, (2) the value 
proposition towards startups, (3) the competence to 
search and select complementing and high-potential 
startups, (4) the fixed timeframe of CAs, (5) the 
facilitation and realization of the collaboration 
between the CA, corporate actors and the startups, (6) 
C-level commitment, and (7) the definition of clear 
objectives. 
On the other hand, within the context of CAs, as 
with every endeavor connected to entrepreneurship 
and innovation, there is a chance of failure. Common 
reasons for these are the competitive and ontological 
contradictions between corporates and startups with 
regard to cultural differences, power imbalances, and 
divergent modes of working as well as conflicting 
interests in resource allocation and speed [5, 9, 18]. In 
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that sense, collaboration might be complicated by 
significant conflicts in basic beliefs as well as 
competitive contradictions [18]. Additionally, the 
attraction of promising startups and lack of needed 
internal resources are two essential failure factors [25].  
Moschner and Herstatt [9], compared CA programs to 
green-washing activities and classified CAs as units 
that engage in entrepreneurial washing. In this view, 
CAs are mostly intended as symbolic action, with 
objectives lacking both the serious intention and 
execution beyond the displayed appearance towards 
the public. Such companies engage in trial-and-error 
with program structures and use CAs mainly to 
enhance their recognition as innovative players in the 
market [9]. The neglection of connecting startups to 
adequate corporate actors may lead to frustration on 
the startup’s side as their main motivation to join CAs 
lies within the connection to the parent company [8]. 
3. Methodology 
The empirical base of this research is a multiple 
case study [27]. To select the cases, we compiled a list 
of 77 European CAs plus information on their parental 
firms. The selected cases are heterogenous in order to 
reveal patterns across the population of strategic CAs 
focused on IT startups. In line with the objectives of 
this research, this sampling technique enabled data 
collection, providing the basis to describe and observe 
key themes of a phenomenon as any patterns that do 
emerge across heterogenous cases are likely to be of 
high value and represent key themes [28, 29]. Hence, 
we narrowed the list down by checking for active CAs. 
We then clustered these based on their heterogeneity, 
relevance to the study and access to sufficient data. 
According to Saunders et al. [28] applying 
heterogeneous or maximum variation sampling, 
demands choosing “participants with sufficiently 
diverse characteristics to provide the maximum 
variation possible in the data collected” [28, p. 301]. 
For the purpose of this research, we studied four CA 
programs of four corporations from the sample list. 
We conducted 13 semi-structured interviews ranging 
between 28 and 67 minutes as the primary means of 
data collection.  The interviewees included active and 
former CA managers, CA managers employed by an 
external CA partner, employees from within the parent 
organization responsible for the collaboration, and a 
startup employee who was responsible for the 
participation in a CA program to allow for different 
perspectives in each case. We anonymize the cases and 
provide an overview of the interviews, case affiliation, 
and codes in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Overview of data sources 
Case Data Sources Code 
Primary 
Data CA1 
Program Manager CA Paris CA1, PM1 
Program Manager CA Berlin CA1, PM2 
Program Manager CA Europe CA1, PM3 
OI Manager CA Europe CA1, OIM 
Collaboration Lead Business Unit CA1, CLC 
Secondary 
Data CA1 
Internal Documents, Website CA1, SD 
Primary 
Data CA2 
Program Manager CA (Partner Side) CA2, PM1 
Program Manager CA CA2, PM2 
Collaboration Lead Business Unit CA2, CLC 
Secondary 
Data CA2 
Website, Annual Report CA2, SD 
Primary  
Data CA3 
Program Manager CA  CA3, PM 
Collaboration Lead Startup  CA3, CLS 
Secondary 
Data CA3 
Website, Annual Report, Magazines CA3, SD 
Primary  
Data CA4 
Program Manager CA CA4, PM 
Collaboration Lead Business Unit CA4, CLC 
Secondary 
Data CA4 
Website, Internal Documents CA4, SD 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted 
using an interview guide including the identified 
themes and key questions necessary to answer the 
research questions. These included but were not 
limited to, the design, the process, the success 
measures, knowledge creation, transfer and adoption, 
success factors, and failure factors or obstacles. As 
each of the interviewees gave their consent, all 
interviews were recorded and then transcribed. In 
addition to this primary data, secondary data have been 
collected in each of the cases for the triangulation of 
the data. This includes data from publicly available 
sources, such as the CAs' websites, press releases, 
news articles, and reports, as well as data collected on 
the cases presented in peer-reviewed journals. 
Additionally, some of the interviewees provided 
confidential documents containing further information 
which were deemed relevant.  
The qualitative data set has been analyzed 
following Thematic Analysis [30]. Hence, the research 
question served as initial guidance on which data to 
code. In total 71 different codes have been identified 
in the data set. To facilitate the process of coding, the 
authors have made use of the data analysis software 
NVivo.  At first, the data has been coded according to 
predetermined themes with regard to objectives, 
design elements , obstacles and outcomes of CAs. 
Thereafter, we have searched for recurring 
relationships and patterns in the data to identify 
inherent themes that aid in answering the research 
question. These patterns have to a great extent 
emerged dynamically in the data across the interviews 
and ultimately led to the discovery of the role of the 
CA and the essential tasks of strategic CAs [28].  
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Table 2 Overview of the sampled cases 
Code           CA1 CA2 CA3 CA4 
External 
Partner 
No Yes No Yes 
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Lastly, to provide sufficient context to this study 
it is relevant to differentiate the cases from each other, 
by highlighting distinct characteristics, thus, 
displaying their heterogeneity (see Table 2), with 
regard to the industries, the decision against or in favor 
of external accelerator partners and to the CA location, 
their maturity or program design, as for example, CA3 
was the only case not following a batch-based, fixed 
timeframe in their CA program. 
4. Findings 
4.1 Underlying Obstacles 
Our analysis revealed three dominant underlying 
obstacles of strategic CAs, (1) missing awareness, 
engagement, or resistance of corporate employees, (2) 
the difficulty of sourcing the right startups, and (3) the 
differences between large corporations and startups 
(see Appendix 1.1.).  
First, not all employees of the parent cooperation 
may share the desire to collaborate with startups and 
integrate an external player into the corporate’s 
ecosystem or solution. The data suggests that this may 
be attributed to a resistance to change or the external 
nature of the startups. Additionally, missing awareness 
of the program or the value of the program may 
contribute to this obstacle.  According to PM2 of CA1, 
“having our whole corporation behind us is the most 
difficult one” [CA1, PM2]. Similarly, the CLC of CA2 
states that ensuring the commitment of everyone 
involved is a big challenge. This big hurdle of missing 
internal alignment and confirmation can make it 
difficult to find someone internally who is ready to 
jump on a startups’ solution. This missing internal 
support may be attributed to the missing awareness 
about the CA and its value in the parent corporation 
and see this as a challenge. Some interviewees 
attribute this missing internal commitment to the 
external nature of the startup solutions, which may be 
seen as competition rather than as being 
complementary. PM2 of CA2 described this problem 
accordingly: "let’s say you are the champion working 
with a startup that is going to revolutionize a part of 
your business. How can [Corporate2] accept that a 
range of its revenues are going to depend on a startup? 
And what are the teams working within the business 
line going to think of themselves, if they realized that 
half of the value that they’re going to create is coming 
from an external player?” [CA2, PM2] 
In addition, to this problem stemming from the 
external nature of the startup solution, others have 
attributed the missing internal commitment or change 
resistance of the corporate employees. Accordingly, 
corporate employees are described as “very protective 
about the current status of things and current 
technologies, they want to keep everything as it was 
before because it’s safer for them and it’s easier not to 
change anything, just keep on doing what they’ve been 
doing forever” [CA2, PM1], further elaborating that 
“they don’t see any obvious benefits of accepting or 
choosing the startup solution because they think that 
they have everything in place” [CA2, PM1]. 
Second, sourcing the right startups for the 
collaboration with the business units may prove to be 
difficult. Both the search and the selection contribute 
to this difficulty. The data implies a high resource 
intensity in search for the startups, strongly 
emphasizing this aspect. The selection necessitates 
ensuring both a fit between the selected business unit 
and the assessment of the ability of startups to deliver 
the expected results. This can be attributed to "failure 
from the startup side when they did not deliver what 
they promised to deliver" [CA2, PM1], or an 
insufficient fit or technical complexity of the 
integration, as well as insufficient care in the selection 
process lacking internal alignment. The difficulty in 
selection is further highlighted by CA4, PM stating 
that: "there are a lot of startups out there and the 
likelihood that you find a good match is not that high" 
[CA4, PM]. The obstacles with regard to the startup 
search led CA2 to partner up with an independent 
accelerator who takes over the sourcing as CA2, PM1 
explains “the search is only on the [Partner] side. […]  
we have around [...] a hundred VC analysts who do 
the search and [...]source the startups, depending on 
the needs and requests of [Corporate 2] so we can 
propose startups we think would be a good fit, we try 
to source specifically for their needs.” [CA2, PM1] 
Third, the data suggest that the actual 
collaboration between the business units and the 
startups may be impeded by differences in size, speed, 
and culture between the startups and the incumbent. 
The internal culture in the parent corporation is seen 
as one of the biggest obstacles as processes in the 
parent corporation can be complex and are often 
lengthy. This includes integral processes for the CA 
programs such as the due diligence for the integration 
into the parent corporation’s platform, and the 
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protection of APIs necessary for the integration. In 
opposition to the slow processes in the incumbent 
firm, the process speed of the startups is seen as fast, 
an assessment that is evident throughout multiple data 
sources. This speed is necessitated by the financial 
constraints of the startups, which thus demand, or 
profit from a fast process of collaboration and 
integration. According to PM1 of CA2 these two 
actors, in addition to the differences in speed 
communicate differently: “Sometimes they speak 
really different languages. I mean, the startup and the 
managers. And sometimes we try to speak with them 
internally, both individually with the startup and then 
with the managers and try to actually like interpret a 
little bit for them to help them find the common 
ground. Because they were speaking about the same 
things, [in] different languages. I mean, not languages 
like foreign languages, but it was just different 
communication from both sides” [CA2, PM1] 
These opposing speeds along with other 
differences in culture, such as communication, can 
lead to a culture clash between the corporates and the 
startups. Ostensibly, this culture clash plays an 
important role in the CA process. The PM of CA3 has 
explained the challenge of this culture clash 
accordingly: “Sometimes it’s difficult to explain to 
startups, especially when they don’t have a corporate 
background on the founders side why things move the 
way they move. And they also sometimes don’t have 
the financial backing to wait for big corporate to come 
to a decision that might go either way after. That’s one 
of the biggest challenges.” [CA3, PM] 
According to the interviewed startup employee, 
this becomes especially problematic if the employees 
in the CA have “the glasses of the corporate” [CA, 
CLS] and cannot translate between the startups and the 
corporate. A related obstacle is the size difference 
between the accelerated startups and the parent 
corporations. According to the CLC of CA2, this size 
difference can be a big hurdle, if the importance of the 
project to the corporation does not fit the size of the 
startup:“there’s a challenge between the size of the 
supplier, because at the end of the day, the startup is a 
supplier, […] and we have to balance very well the 
size of the project and the size of the supplier. Because 
otherwise, we can have trouble […] in the due 
diligence that we do every time we onboard a supplier. 
[...] because their activity is, you know, too bold too 
big in size, in magnitude, in terms of investment for the 
kind of supplier they represent.” [CA2, CLC] 
4.2 The Role of the Strategic Corporate 
Accelerator 
Our data shows that the role of the CA in 
mitigating these obstacles and enabling collaboration 
can be divided into three essential tasks which have 
been derived from themes that have emerged through 
the analysis and coding of the data (see Appendix 1.2). 
These three essential tasks are: motivating, 
matchmaking, and mediating. Each of these essential 
tasks corresponds to one of the three identified 
underlying obstacles. This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Essential tasks of the strategic 
CA and the corresponding obstacles 
 
First, motivating is aimed towards mitigating the 
first obstacle of internal resistance. It includes 
advertising the program and the value it provides or 
may provide for the parental firm and its business 
units. Motivating internal stakeholders and creating 
awareness, as an essential task of a strategic CA is 
supported by various interviewees. For instance, PM2 
of CA2 emphasized the process of "building and 
raising the visibility within [Corporate2] so all the 
business lines are aware of such programs and feel 
comfortable with working with startups within the 
accelerator" [CA2, PM2]. PM2 of CA1 supported this 
statement, adding the importance of communicating 
the value, "for every program, we have to first create 
awareness and we have to highlight what value we 
bring to [Corporate1] so that we can have the buy-in 
and agreement from our own people" [CA1, PM2]. 
This may involve changing the mindset of the 
employees: "that's part of our job to connect and to 
change the mindset within [Corporate1] employees" 
[CA1, PM2]. It became further evident in the data that 
the CAs may have to overcome internal resistance to 
innovation: "we try to actually convince the people 
who are skeptical. We […] tried to show them the 
benefits of collaborating with startups" [CA2, PM1]. 
Second, matchmaking is aimed at resolving the 
difficulties associated with selecting the right 
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collaboration. It involves internal and external 
scouting, due diligence of the startups, an assessment 
of the strategic fit between the business units and the 
startups, and aligning their expectations. PM2 of CA2 
described this process of matchmaking as "to source 
startups, to find the right ones and to match them with 
the business line" [CA2, PM2]. Sourcing and selecting 
the optimal startups is seen as an essential task of the 
CA. The data suggests that it is not only considered 
important to identify the right startups but also to 
internally select the right business lines by assessing 
their needs and commitment beforehand. Multiple 
evidence in the data has suggested the importance of 
assessing the startups’ capabilities to deliver on the 
expected results. Moreover, compatibility with the 
corporate and the first judgement of startups by the 
corporate actors are deemed important. The external 
and, more importantly, the internal networks of the CA 
employees may be crucial for fulfilling this task 
sufficiently. Additionally, the data has revealed the 
need to align expectations of business units and 
startups prior to the acceleration, to request 
commitment of both parties and to address political 
and processual challenges in the corporate setting. 
Third, mediating is targeted towards mitigating 
the differences between the parental corporation and 
the startups, in terms of size, speed of processes, and 
culture. Mediating includes translating between these 
two stakeholders, facilitating the collaboration by 
enabling or speeding up processes, as well as ensuring 
the continuous commitment of the involved actors. 
CLC from CA2 described this role as the CA being the 
"referee in the match between startups and corporate 
champions" [CA2, CLC]. Similarly, the PM of CA2 
claimed "for some reasons, it works better when there 
is a mediator" [CA2, PM1]. Therefore, the CA may 
act as a translator between the startups and corporates, 
explaining the cultural and social differences to align 
expectations and improve the collaboration. As they 
"sometimes speak really different languages" [CA2, 
PM1] the CAs may aim to become “a translator 
between the two worlds" [CA3, PM].  
The data further indicated that the CA may 
continuously measure outcomes by monitoring 
commitment and tracking progress, as well as 
resolving concerns and potential frictions or 
misbehaviors within the collaboration of both sides. A 
structured program, with specific milestones and a set 
deadline, may be used to ensure this commitment. 
Further, the CA may try to remove impediments and 
ease the process of collaboration by providing the 
technical infrastructure, accelerating internal 
processes, or managing complex approval flows, thus 
facilitating the inherent processes. The data suggest, 
that after the acceleration process, the CA may use 
results for motivation, essentially creating a positive 
reinforcement loop, which is depicted in Figure 2. This 
may involve measuring the results and the value and 
effectiveness of the CA. It may also be used to 
convince top management of the overall performance 
and, thus, to ensure top management support. 
 
Figure 2 Positive reinforcement loop  
 
The broader analysis of the different facets of the 
sampled CA programs with regard to design options 
of strategic CAs and the motivations behind them, 
served as the foundation for the proposed framework 
showcasing the underlying role of the strategic CA. 
The framework is illustrated in Figure 3. It intends to 
depict the role of the strategic CA in enabling startup 
partnerships and OL for the parental firm. This 
illustration visualizes the CA in the parental firm's 
ecosystem to emphasize the strategic CA as an enabler 
and facilitator of collaborations between parts of the 
large parental firm and the small startups. The 
components of the essential tasks of the strategic CA 
are shown for each of the stakeholders of the CA 
process. As depicted, the task of mediating is targeted 
towards reducing the underlying obstacles of the 
collaboration. As important but optional relations, the 
tasks towards ensuring top management support and 
including customers in the collaborations are included.  
The role of the strategic CA may also comprise 
the parent corporation’s customers as stakeholders. 
The essential tasks are found to be similar to those 
necessary in the collaboration between the business 
units and the startups as can be observed in Figure 1. 
The CA may involve customers early in the 
collaboration. Ideally, they are already involved 
before the pre-acceleration. Thereby, the underlying 
customer's needs must be meticulously researched to 
derive and identify a suitable solution for this in the 
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form of startup solutions. These activities of the CA 
result also in a key driver to attract startups to the 
program as "our treasure box is access and exposure 
to more than four hundred thousand customers that 
[Corporate1] has" [CA1, PM2].  
Figure 3 Framework role of the strategic CA 
Concluding from the above, we find that the 
strategic CA connects the adequate stakeholders and 
enables or facilitates their collaboration. Thereby, the 
strategic CA should focus on accelerating the 
collaboration rather than the startup itself. In this role, 
CAs mainly need to concentrate on the tasks of 
motivating, matchmaking, and mediating between the 
stakeholders of the program, to mitigate the 
underlying obstacles of the collaboration and ensure 
successful future viability.  
5. Implications 
5.1 Theoretical Implications 
To highlight our contribution, we juxtapose our 
findings with prior literature. We identified three 
underlying obstacles: missing company support, 
difficulty of startup scouting, and vast differences 
between startups and large corporations in terms of 
size, speed, and culture. These findings are consistent 
with prior literature (see [8, 9, 18, 25]) and give 
salience to the fact that the differences between 
startups, and large corporations are characterized by 
"significant tensions in values, perceptions and modes 
of operation" [18, p. 18]. Our findings extend the 
literature by positioning these obstacles in light of the 
different tasks that are essential for an effective design 
of a strategic CA. This understanding enriches how 
future scholarship can engage with the concept of 
strategic CA and how it can be positioned to mitigate 
these obstacles through its essential tasks.  
In this regard, we propose a framework unpacking 
the role of the strategic CA. The framework offers a 
different perspective from prior CA literature where 
the tasks of the CA are usually presented in a 
sequential process logic (e.g., [4, 22, 23]). We take a 
perspective that present their role within their 
ecosystem and showcase the different actors in the CA 
process and their relationships. This allows for an 
understanding of the design elements and builds on the 
perspective by scholars such as Nesner et al’s. [24] 
focus on the knowledge flow between the actors 
involved in the CA process. 
Our study goes one step further by identifying the 
essential tasks of a strategic CA in its underlying role: 
motivating internally, matchmaking between the 
business units and the startups, and mediating the 
collaboration. To the best of our knowledge, no CA 
scholar has so far explicitly highlighted the tasks of 
motivating internally to create awareness and to 
mitigate change resistance as an essential task of the 
strategic CA. Yet, our study shows that these are 
important, if not critical, role-defining tasks for a 
strategic CA that holds important implications for how 
we engage with the concept of strategic CAs in 
scholarship and practice. We suggest that the absence 
of this role may preclude scholars from an important 
consideration in the effective design of CAs and may 
contribute to why many CAs have a fleeting shelf life 
before running aground. Furthermore, in consonance 
with Gutmann et al. [8],  our findings on matchmaking 
reveal that the neglection of connecting startups to the 
adequate corporate actors may lead to frustration on 
the startup’s side as their main motivation to join CAs 
lies within the matchmaking and connection to the 
parent company. This is in contrast with prior 
literature that present CA employees as bridge makers 
[17] or boundary-spanners [25] at the individual 
employees level, which is limited to the knowledge 
flows in the acceleration process. Thus, these notions 
do not capture what we find and describe with the tasks 
of mediating and matchmaking between the involved 
actors to achieve a successful partnership. 
Through presenting the CA in such a way and 
identifying the essential tasks and the underlying role 
of a strategic CA, we enrich the understanding of 
strategic CAs in the literature by providing a different 
perspective on the phenomenon. With this 
understanding of the phenomenon, we have been able 
to unveil key roles that should serve as pertinent 
implication for design elements of a strategic CA. 
Accordingly, we propose that an effective strategic 
CA should be primarily designed to optimally fulfill its 
role, rather than by simply following a list of design 
elements as, for example, proposed by Kohler [17] that 
are based on the independent accelerator literature and 
then adopted to the CA phenomenon. However, doing 
this will require a clear understanding of the roles of a 
strategic CA. We believe we have only scratched the 
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surface in this line of inquiry and the opportunity for 
future research to further sharpen our understanding in 
this regard remains vast. 
5.2 Managerial Recommendations  
Our research suggests that effective design should 
not be based on the manifestations of the individual 
design elements but rather on the optimal fulfillment 
of the underlying role of strategic CAs. When creating 
or redesigning a strategic CA program, there is value 
in considering the essential tasks the CA should fulfill. 
Only subsequently should the optimal configuration of 
the individual design elements required for their 
specific context be considered. We suggest that a 
strategic CA program should strive to mitigate the 
underlying obstacles and leverage the essential tasks 
to foster successful collaborations. 
Based on our findings, for practitioners aiming for 
their CA to fulfill the tasks of motivating internally 
and matchmaking (i.e., selecting the right business 
unit representatives while being able to scout and 
attract the right startups), the choice of location and 
integration is essential to enable direct contact and 
short lines of communication. Also, to fulfill the three 
identified tasks, the team composition may derive 
value from possessing both strong internal and 
external networks as well as an understanding of both 
large incumbents' and startups' ways of working.  
Considering the process design elements of search 
and selection, the essential task of matchmaking 
implies a close involvement of the participating 
business units in this process, searching for startups 
that fulfill their needs, and selecting those with optimal 
strategic fit and ability to deliver. A batch logic with a 
fixed timeframe may be beneficial to ensure 
commitment and accountability from the actors 
involved in the acceleration process. With regard to 
the program offering, the essential tasks of the CA 
imply a focus on collaborative projects with the 
business units to test and prepare a subsequent 
partnership. Thus, a focus should be placed on 
individual support for the startups and the 
collaborations rather than on educational offerings. 
This has further implications on the number of startups 
of an individual batch or cohort, which should be 
limited to a manageable number of startups that can be 
supported individually. The necessity of motivating 
internally to create awareness and mitigate change 
resistance implies the value of implementing success 
measures for the program to prove effectiveness and 
value to the parental firm. These success measures as 
proof of effectiveness and value can motivate 
internally and reinsure management support to create 
a positive reinforcement loop for the CA program.  
5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
As with any scientific work, there are limitations 
to this paper. The first limitation stems from the 
qualitative research design chosen, which implies a 
limit to the generalizability of the study’s results. We 
thus call for further research adopting other 
generalizable methods to examine these results 
further. For example, the relationships between 
stakeholders and the essential tasks of the CA could be 
further studied in a larger sample. Moreover, the 
authors do not claim that the analysis based on a 
heterogeneous sample of four cases is sufficient to 
explain the underlying evolution of strategic CAs in its 
entirety. Nevertheless, we provide a sound starting 
point for further research to investigate the construct 
of strategic CAs from this novel angle taking into 
account the underlying role of the CA. Our study is 
well suited to initiate a discussion on the shortcomings 
of the current understanding of strategic CAs and the 
efficacy of their design.  
We encourage further research on the effective 
configurations between the role of context, resource 
availability, objectives of the CA, and the structure 
and uniqueness of the parental organization and its 
environment, in finding the optimal design . Lastly, 
this research has mostly focused on examining CAs 
from the parent corporations' perspective. Thus, it 
might be beneficial for future research to take a 
startups' perspective to explore how their interests may 
converge or diverge from the corporates'.  
5.4 Conclusion 
Our approach to provide recommendations for a 
well-orchestrated design for strategic CAs has been to 
study the multifaceted CA process and the existing 
design manifestation in a heterogeneous multiple case 
study in the digital context. In the process we have 
found three underlying obstacles of the collaboration 
between the business units and the startups: the 
missing awareness or resistance of the corporate 
employees, the difficulty of sourcing the right startups, 
and the differences between corporations and startups.  
While valuable on their own, these findings on the 
underlying obstacles function as the foundation for the 
identified role of strategic CAs presented in our 
advanced framework. The proposed role is based on 
the finding that the essential tasks of the CA are aimed 
at mitigating the underlying obstacles of the 
collaboration between corporates and startups. The 
essential tasks of the strategic CA to mitigate these 
obstacles that have been identified are: motivating 
internally, matchmaking between the startups and the 
business units, and mediating the collaboration by 
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translating, facilitating, and ensuring commitment. In 
summary, our findings imply that if a strategic CA is 
designed to optimally fulfill its role in the ecosystem, 
i.e., through motivating, matchmaking, and mediating, 
it may be able to mitigate the underlying obstacles 
hindering the collaboration between business units and 
startups. Consequently, by positioning and designing 
a CA in such a manner, the strategic CA has the 
potential to be more than an entrepreneurial washing 
unit with the sole purpose of providing an innovative 
image as described by Moschner and Herstatt [9]. 
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"So there are hundreds of different hurdles and obstacles. The first one being internal engagement. In many cases, we have 
created solutions, but poor engagement from the business lines to work with them." [CA2, PM2] 
"Having our whole corporation behind us is the most difficult one." [CA1, PM2] 
Disrupting Internal 
Units 
"Let's say you are the champion and working with a startup that is going to revolutionize a part of your business. How can 
[Corporate 2] accept that a range of its revenues are going to depend on a startup. And what are the teams working within the 
business line are going to think of themselves, if they realized that half of the value that they're going to create is coming 
from an external player?" [CA2, PM2] 
Not known in the 
Organization "We need more of showing the world and also the internal world what kind of cool startups we have as partners." [CA1, OIM] 
Political Obstacles 
"There were two things coming from [Corporate 4]. The whole corporate had a very big reorganization which also changed 
budget responsibilities that were all rearranged. And people are very busy implementing this change and they don't know, OK, 





"you need to bring in - and that's what we didn't do so much - (...) customer feedback, very early, and don't build too long on 
an integration. And don't think when you talk to a customer you want to sell it, you have to get the feedback. It's  purely the 
feedback. And that's something... (...)  don't think as a perfectionist in a sense of it needs to be perfectly integrated, then I sell 
it, but rather have (...) validation points. You have to find a way that you have a customer who gives you feedback" [CA1, PM3] 
Startup Performance "but sometimes (...) they do not take this partnership very serious (...) More I would say it was just failure from the startup side 
when they did not deliver what they promised to deliver and they just did not finish the program" [CA2, PM1] 
Startup Selection "the failure adds up. Yeah, so you selected a startup and it turns out to be not the perfect startup. Then the processes at 
[Corporate1] are difficult. The customer situation is difficult. (...) If somebody says, could you do better?  [CA1, OIM] 
Internal Selection "Or there are also internal dynamics that it's not always that easy to find someone who is ready to jump on a partner 






"Sometimes it's difficult to explain to startups, especially when they don't have a corporate background on the founders side 
why things move the way they move. And they also sometimes don't have the financial backing to wait for big corporate to 
come to a decision that might go either way after. That's one of the biggest challenges." [CA3, PM] 
"one of the biggest obstacles is the internal culture, I would say, within the organization" [CA2, PM] 
Culture Clash 
"sometimes they speak really different languages, the startup and the managers. And sometimes we try to speak with them 
internally, both individually with the startup and then with the managers, and try to interpret a little bit for them to help them 
find the common ground, basically. Because they were speaking about the same things, but different languages" [CA2, PM1] 
Speed "The first thing that comes up in my mind is the pacing of decisions. I mean, startups decide on the, how do you say, on the doorstep (...) And corporates have a long decision process" [CA4, CLC] 
Technology 
Openness 
"And that's why I think for us at [Corporate 1] it is so crucial that the business technology platform gives easy access for 
startups. And it's not complicated. And it's like for free. You learn easily how to do it. (...) In a way our processes are a complete 
failure. As I said, we don't have easy access for startups. We don't have easy access to test systems. We don't have a good 
education for startups" [CA1, OIM] 









Resistance "That's part of our job to connect it and to change the mindset within [Corporate1] employees" [CA1, PM1] 
Raising Internal 
Awareness 
"So for every program, we have to first create awareness and we have to kind of highlight what value we bring to [Corporate1] so that we can 
have the buy-in and agreement from our own people." [CA1, PM2] 
"And we are building and raising the visibility of the program within [Corporate 2]. So all the business lines are aware of such programs and 
feel comfortable with working with startups within the accelerator" [CA2, PM2] 
Matchmake 
Selection & Scouting 
"The quality of the startups that we bring to our internal stakeholders really has been the most important factor" [CA1, PM2] 
"to source startups, to find the right ones and to match them with the business lines (...)" [CA2, PM2] 
Networking & 
Matchmaking 
"they had a very regular exchange with the business unit, that was also something we asked our colleagues from the business that they should 
support with technical, but also with business knowhow because we felt that this is something where [Corporate4] could really add some 
value or give some benefit to the startups." [CA4, PM] 
"I think the key role would be identifying the right startups and knowing that, oh, this startup absolutely fits with this product. We need this. 
Our customers need this. So having the overview and the sharpness to understand if the startup is a high potential and kind of expose them to 
our internal stakeholders would be, to be honest, the main responsibility here or it's key" [CA1, PM2] 
Mediate 
Address Questions & 
Obstacles within LoBs 
"they could also have a way to answer or they could track if there were frictions (...) lack of commitment on both sides, if we were experiencing 
problems or delays for example (...) useful to understand potential frictions, potential, you know, misbehavior." [CA2, CLC] 
"They were also the people to ask questions, to, if there were any if there was anything during the process, so they were there, the ones 
leading through the process." [CA4, CLC] 
Cloud & Technical 
Support 
"And of course benefit is also that they have people, technical architects, who work with them on the integration because it's really 
complicated" [CA1, PM3] 
Go-To-Market Support 
"we push them through the app centre and then introduce them to account executives or [Corporate1] gets and try to have customer 
exposure." [CA1, PM2] 
"a startup has a very hard time approaching these big companies because they are not prepared to have business with such a small player (...) 
if you go there together, then this can open some doors. And so this is also where we offered our support" [CA4, PM] 
Mediator 
"We try to mitigate that by setting expectations for the startups becoming a translator between the two worlds." [CA3, PM] 
"obviously they can do it themselves, but from my experience, it just works better. For some reasons, it works better when there is a mediator 
(...) the mediator because we understand also both (...) But we understand very well the problems that they have within the bank. But we also 
have a lot of connections with the startup world, like the speed with which the startups are working and the same with the colleagues, 
because we work together as one team." [CA2, PM1] 
"A mediator before the conflict is there. And it's change management for a lot of our established developers and departments,  it's change 




"I'm responsible for collaboration together with our external partners, meaning mostly our customers who want to do in some sort of way a 
corporation or open innovation together with [Corporate3]." [CA3, PM] 
"And then we also offer them our customers. And if the customers want to build a pilot or PoC directly with the startups they could participate 
and join. So that's kind of a side-use case then as well. Additionally to the technical integration" [CA1, PM1] 
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